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Abstract 
When judging a voter’s decision, does that voter’s reason for casting their vote influence moral and 
interpersonal judgments about them? In the context of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, past 
research suggests two competing predictions. First, people regularly account for an actor’s 
intentions when forming judgments of the actor, indicating that judgments may vary according to a 
voter’s motives. However, people are unlikely to see nuance amongst outgroups, especially amidst 
divisive political partisanship, suggesting that judgments would ignore information about voters’ 
motives. In Study 1, results supported the first prediction, showing that both Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump supporters distinguished between different voting motives when making moral and 
interpersonal judgments of outgroup voters. When some voters’ motives became much more 
extreme, Studies 2 and 3 found that Clinton and Trump supporters again distinguished between 
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         Imagine being a Hillary Clinton supporter in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, and you have 
two acquaintances who voted for Donald Trump. One supported Trump’s positions and values; the 
second generally supports the Republican Party, despite personally disagreeing with many of 
Trump’s positions and values. Do their motives matter when judging each acquaintance on moral 
and interpersonal levels? Or, is all that matters the fact that this person cast a vote for a candidate 
whom the observer finds objectionable, rendering that voter’s motives irrelevant? Prior research 
suggests two potential answers to these questions.  
Under one perspective, the vote itself might speak louder than the reasons behind it. In 
other words, if an act brings about a positive or negative outcome, the reasons for that act do not 
matter; instead, the act will be judged solely based on its outcome. When it comes to judging others’ 
voting behavior, this consequentialist perspective suggests that judgments hinge solely upon 
whether the vote itself is seen as positive or negative by the judge. Returning to the example in the 
prior paragraph, a Clinton supporter should object to a vote cast for Trump regardless of the reasons 
behind it, thereby evaluating the morality of two voters similarly, despite their differing motives. 
Evidence from psychological and political research supports that such consequentialist reasoning 
may occur in the context of American politics. American voters are increasingly defined by their 
political affiliations, and one’s tribal affinity for one side of the partisan spectrum can be an 
important aspect of one’s social identity (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Indeed, Americans who 
identify with a political party have become much more likely to view the opposing political party and 
its members negatively (Haidt & Hetherington, 2012; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012); and both 
Democrats and Republicans are increasingly likely to overestimate the degree of political 
polarization in the U.S. (Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2015).  
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In recent years, political party membership has become an increasingly salient defining 
attribute of ingroup membership; indeed, party membership in the U.S. is as polarizing as race and 
decreasing numbers of Americans are willing to marry a member of the opposite political party 
(Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Research on intergroup perceptions consistently finds that people 
perceive members of outgroups as possessing undesirable traits (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), tend to see 
them as all alike (i.e., much more homogeneous than one’s ingroup; Boldry, Gaertner, & Quinn, 
2007; Linville & Jones, 2007), and express open dislike and hostility towards them (Iyengar & 
Westwood, 2015). Thus, this perspective suggests that simply voting for the opposing candidate 
would brand a person as unacceptable, with no consideration of his or her motives. One week after 
the election, this perspective appeared in a Slate article entitled, “There’s No Such Thing as a Good 
Trump Voter”, in which the author argued that Trump was such an abhorrent candidate that no 
votes in his favor could be justified, regardless of a voter’s motivation (Bouie, 2016). 
 On the other hand, research from moral psychology suggests that, unlike the 
consequentialist perspective, a voter should be judged by her reasons for casting a vote, and not the 
vote itself. Although we are not aware of research that has addressed the influence of voting 
motives on judgments of voters, several models of moral judgment contend that an actor’s 
motivations are considered when making moral judgments of the actor and their act (Cushman, 
2008; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). Based on this theoretical 
background, the motivational perspective suggests that Americans may care about another’s 
motives for voting when judging their behavior, even if that person voted for a candidate the judge 
finds objectionable. Indeed, research suggests that considerations of an actor’s intentions are at the 
top of the hierarchy of inferences made when judging someone’s actions, ahead of considerations 
about the actor’s personality or desires (Malle & Holbrook, 2012).  
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In the realm of moral blame, negative outcomes that are produced by actors with different 
intentions may be judged differently. For instance, Alicke (1992) presented participants with a 
vignette about a driver (John) who hit another car at an intersection while driving over the speed 
limit, resulting in multiple injuries to the victim. However, John’s motivation for speeding was 
manipulated between two conditions: John always wanted to get home quickly to hide something 
from his parents, but that item was either a vial of cocaine or an anniversary gift for his parents. 
Even though the same negative consequences occurred regardless of John’s motivations (e.g., an 
injurious car accident), participants saw him as being more to blame for the accident when he was 
racing home to hide his cocaine (Alicke, 1992). Thus, participants judged an actor’s behavior 
differently according to his motivations, even despite very negative consequences. Translating these 
conclusions to the example at the beginning of this paper, the Clinton supporter might judge her two 
Trump-voting acquaintances differently depending on their motives for voting for Trump, despite 
the subjectively negative outcome in both cases. Although supporting Trump because he was the 
chosen Republican Party nominee might be tolerable, supporting Trump because of his (perceived) 
controversial positions and values might be a step too far. Consistent with this perspective, another 
post-election popular press article (entitled, “Sorry, Liberals. Bigotry Didn’t Elect Donald Trump.”) 
urged liberals to consider the numerous motives for voting for Trump (Kuhn, 2017).  
Because moral values and convictions are frequently interlaced with Americans’ voting 
decisions (Westen, 2007), it is logical to study the perceived morality of voting decisions and 
motives. Indeed, Skitka and Bauman (2008) found that having stronger moral convictions about the 
2004 major-party presidential candidates and the relevant issues at the time predicted self-reported 
voting behavior and intentions to vote. Moreover, having such moral convictions motivated political 
engagement in general for those across the political spectrum (Skitka & Morgan, 2014), and many 
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Americans felt that their candidate preference was a reflection of their own moral values (Skitka & 
Bauman, 2008). Moreover, moral conviction about candidate preference has been linked to 
enthusiasm about one’s preferred candidate and hostility towards the non-preferred candidate in 
the 2012 presidential election (Brandt, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2015), an association that was likely to 
occur again in 2016, given the high levels of negativity about the 2016 major-party candidates 
(Geiger, 2016).  
         Beyond moral judgments, what are the interpersonal and relational consequences of a 
voter’s motives? Although partisanship is among the most divisive categories in the U.S. (Iyengar & 
Westwood, 2015), interpersonal judgments may depend on the perceived severity of the act. When 
judging a perceived immoral act, the judge’s tolerance for the actor decreases with the emotional 
intensity of the judge’s moral conviction (Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008); that is, as one’s moral 
conviction about a subject increases, so should one’s moral condemnation of someone who violates 
those moral principles. Therefore, if some motivations for voting for a presidential candidate are 
considered less moral than others, then the judge should exhibit lower tolerance of those voters and 
want to associate with them less (Ryan, 2016; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Wright et al., 2008). 
Thus, if the Clinton supporter from the beginning example judges one of the two Trump-supporting 
acquaintances to have less moral motives, then the Clinton supporter should tolerate that person 
less and seek distance (vs. closeness) from that person.  
         The present research addresses these questions across three studies conducted after the 
2016 U.S. Presidential Election. In Study 1, participants who self-identified as either Clinton or Trump 
supporters judged people who voted for the opposing candidate (“outgroup” voters). In Study 2, 
participants again judged outgroup voters, though third party voters were included for judgment in 
comparison to some of the voter profiles from Study 1, with a focus on the voters most likely to elicit 
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negative judgments from outgroup observers. Finally, Study 3 participants judged the same batch of 
voters from Study 2, but this time, they were people who voted for the participant’s preferred 
candidate (“ingroup” voters).  
In each study, we investigate whether people judge voters and their voting behavior solely 
by the content of their vote (the consequentialist perspective), or whether they account for a voter’s 
motives when forming evaluations of them (the motivational perspective). If participants evaluate 
“believer” and “party loyalist” voters similarly on moral and interpersonal levels, this would confirm 
the consequentialist perspective and suggest that people disregard voters’ reasons and motives for 
their voting decisions. However, if participants evaluate “believer” and “party loyalist” voters 
differently, this would confirm the motivational perspective, suggesting that voters’ motives are 
considered in such evaluations.  
Study 1: Judgments of outgroup voters and their motives 
Study 1 investigates whether Clinton and Trump supporters differentiated between 
outgroup voters based on their reasons for voting (i.e., the motivational perspective), or whether 
they treated all voters equally regardless of reasons (i.e., the consequentialist perspective). 
Specifically, Study 1 measures whether moral evaluations and tolerance of these voters differed 
depending on one’s reasons for voting.  
Method 
Participants   
Four hundred and one American adults were recruited through MTurk for compensation of 
$1.00. Participants were excluded for failing an attention check (n = 16) or indicating that their data 
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should not be used (n = 0), resulting in a final sample of 385 participants (54.5% male; 82.9% 
White/Caucasian; Mage = 35.74 years, SDage = 10.44) comprised of 245 Clinton supporters and 140 
Trump supporters. This was sufficient to meet our goal to have at least 60 Trump supporters per cell, 
accounting for research showing that there are fewer conservative workers on MTurk than liberal 
workers (Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015). Self-identified political affiliation was as follows: 25.7% 
Republican or lean Republican; 18.2% Independent; 49.6% Democrat or lean Democrat; and, the 
remaining 6.5% either had no preference, wrote in another option, or did not answer. To collect data 
quickly after the election’s conclusion and to gather participants of ideological diversity, we used 
MTurk as the data collection source for all studies in the present research. Ideological differences 
obtained in MTurk samples have been shown to be similar to ideological differences in nationally 
representative panel studies (Clifford et al., 2015). 
Design 
In Study 1, all participants judged two voters who had not voted for the participant’s 
preferred candidate (i.e., “outgroup” voters), but who varied in their motives: the “believer,” or 
someone who voted for the opposing major-party candidate because they agreed with the 
candidate’s positions and values; or the “party loyalist,” someone who voted for the opposing 
major-party candidate because they primarily supported that candidate’s political party affiliation. 
All participants evaluated both a “party loyalist” and “believer” voter (in random order), but there 
were two varieties of the “believer” that participants were randomly assigned to judge. These two 
“believers” were designed to reflect the diverse ways a voter could agree with a candidate’s values: 
a “less extreme believer” who agrees with a candidate’s more conventional positions and values, or 
an “extreme believer” who is motivated by a candidate’s most controversial or extreme 
characteristics (Full voter profiles are printed in the following section). Study 1 had a mixed 2 
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(candidate preference: Clinton or Trump) x 2 (believer extremity: “less extreme believer” or 
“extreme believer”) x 2 (target voter type: believer or party loyalist) design, with candidate 
preference and believer extremity as between-subjects factors, and voter type as a within-subjects 
factor.  
Procedure 
The survey began with the question, “Regardless of whether or not you voted in the recent 
U.S. Presidential Election, which of the two major party candidates did you prefer?” In response, 
participants could select either Clinton or Trump. Once a participant’s preferred candidate had been 
determined, participants were presented with short vignettes about “outgroup” voters who 
supported the opposing major party candidate (i.e., the participant’s non-preferred candidate). 
Participants read vignettes about two hypothetical voters (“believer” and “party loyalist”), presented 
in a random order. The “believer” profile was also randomly assigned to be “less extreme” or 
“extreme.”  
All voter profiles began with “Imagine an individual who says they voted for *Donald 
Trump/Hillary Clinton+ because…” The remainder of the voter profile was changed depending on 
candidate preference and condition. For example, a Trump-supporting participant reading about a 
Clinton “less extreme believer” voter read: 
…they believed in her plans to improve conditions for the middle class by raising the 
minimum wage, preserving the Affordable Care Act (aka, Obamacare), and improving 
educational access.  
Or, a Clinton-supporting participant reading about a Trump “less extreme believer” voter read: 
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…they believed in his plans to improve conditions for the middle class by bringing back 
American manufacturing jobs, repealing the Affordable Care Act (aka, Obamacare), and 
improving the nation’s infrastructure. 
Or, a Trump-supporting participant reading about a Clinton “extreme believer” voter read: 
Imagine an individual who says they voted for Hillary Clinton because they agree with her 
plans to disregard the Second Amendment, agree that half of Americans are “deplorables”, 
and are proud of her endorsement by Cecile Richards, the president of Planned Parenthood. 
Or, a Clinton-supporting participant reading a Trump “extreme believer” voter read: 
…they agree with his plans to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico, ban Muslim 
immigrants, and are proud of his endorsement by David Duke, former Grand Wizard of the 
Ku Klux Klan. 
 Or, a Clinton-supporting participant reading about a Trump “party loyalist” voter would have read:  
…they agree with Republican Party principles and he is the candidate their party chose, even 
though they personally disagree with his racist, sexist, misogynistic, and homophobic 
comments and actions. 
Or, a Trump-supporting participant reading about a Clinton “party loyalist” voter would have read:  
…they agree with Democratic Party principles and she is the candidate their party chose, 
even though they personally disagree with her financial and political corruption.  
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After reading each vignette, participants reported their moral judgments of the voter’s 
behavior and character, and their interpersonal tolerance for the voter, including evaluations of the 
voter’s personality traits. Lastly, participants provided demographic information. 
Measures 
         Moral evaluations. Participants first evaluated each of the voters on seven items measuring 
morality, character, and intentionality. The following four items were included to measure moral 
evaluations of the voter’s action, as well as the participant’s feelings and trust for the voter:  
Moral acceptability. “How morally acceptable is this person’s action?” (1 not at all 
acceptable – 7 completely acceptable). 
Moral character. “To what extent do you think this person possesses strong moral 
character?” (1 not at all – 7 very much). 
Trustworthiness. “To what extent is this person trustworthy?” (1 not at all – 7 very much). 
Feelings toward voter. “Overall, how would you rate your feelings about this person? 
(reverse-coded: 1 very positive – 7 very negative). 
Perceptions of agency. The following three items were inspired by research on mind 
perception and moral judgment (Gray et al., 2009) and were included to measure the participant’s 
perceptions of the voter’s causal connection to the consequences of the election (positive or 
negative). In particular, the following measures were included to detect whether certain voter types 
were seen as being more capable, intentional, and agentic compared to others: 
Capability of recognizing right and wrong. “To what extent do you believe this person is 
capable of recognizing right versus wrong?” (1 not at all capable – 7 very capable). 
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Agency. “How much thought does this person give to their behaviors before acting?” (1 
none at all - 7 a lot). 
Responsibility for election’s outcome. “How responsible is this person for contributing to 
the outcome of the election?” (1 not at all responsible - 7 very responsible).  
Tolerance. Three separate measures of interpersonal tolerance were used.  
Perceived traits. Participants rated the voters along 15 dimensions on a five-point bipolar 
scale: accepting, inattentive, loyal, anxious, moral, unsupportive, selfish, careless, reliable, likable, 
unintelligent, positive, not loving, submissive, and professional.1 After reverse-scoring negative 
traits, the ratings were averaged to form a single composite, where higher ratings indicated more 
positive trait inferences or higher levels of tolerance (Cronbach’s αbeliever = .94; Cronbach’s αparty loyalist 
= .93).  
Willingness to interact. Participants were asked to indicate their willingness to interact with 
the voter in a variety of domains, including: intermittent social relations; work or business relations; 
guest at one’s home; intimate friendship; letting children play together; and having the person as a 
next-door neighbor (rated on a scale from 1 not at all willing - 5 definitely willing; Roccas & Amit, 
2011). These items were combined to create a score of willingness to interact (Cronbach’s αbeliever = 
.95; Cronbach’s αparty loyalist = .94).  
                                                          
1
 The dominant-submissive item was not included in the final scale because depending on the context, 
dominant and submissive could be seen as either positive or negative traits. Therefore, the final scale had 14 
items.  
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Feelings of closeness. Participants were asked, “How close do you feel to this person?” and 
responded using a seven-point scale (1 not at all close – 7 very close; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).    
Exposure to voter profiles. After each vignette, participants were asked three questions to 
measure their familiarity with the voter profiles included in the present research. First, participants 
were asked, “To what extent did you hear about voters who met this description in media coverage 
of the 2016 Presidential Election?” and responded using a seven-point scale (1 not at all – 7 very 
often). Next, participants read, “To what extent do you think voters like this existed?” and 
responded using a seven-point scale (1 definitely not – 7 definitely yes). Lastly, participants were 
asked, “To what extent did you know people who fit this description?” and responded on a seven-
point scale (1 none at all – 7 very many).  
Results 
Data analyses 
 For the following analyses, we conducted mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA) using two 
between-subjects factors (candidate preference, belief extremity) and one within-subjects factor 
(voter type). For specific values and effect sizes, please see the Supplemental Results. 
Moral evaluations 
 We were primarily interested in whether moral judgments differed depending on the voter’s 
motivations for voting, but also whether this difference was affected by belief extremity. Belief 
extremity influenced the directionality of the differences between believers and party loyalists. 
Between “party loyalists” and “extreme believers,” party loyalists were rated more favorably on 
measures of: moral acceptability, F(1, 381) = 127.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.25; moral character, F(1, 381) =  
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110.09, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.22; trustworthiness, F(1, 381) = 97.75, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.20; capability of 
recognizing right versus wrong, F(1, 381) = 119.22, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.24; thinking before acting, F(1, 
381) = 24.97, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.06; personal feelings towards the voter, F(1, 381) = 68.41, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 0.15. Interestingly, the pattern of results is the opposite when judging “party loyalists” and “less 
extreme believers.” When compared to less extreme believers, party loyalists were rated less 
favorably on measures of: moral acceptability, F(1, 381) = 26.65, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.07; moral 
character, F(1, 381) = 27.91, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.07; trustworthiness, F(1, 381) = 12.20, p = .001, ηp
2 = 
0.03; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, F(1, 381) = 4.72, p = .030, ηp
2 = 0.01; and thinking 
before acting, F(1, 381) = 27.67, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.07. There were no significant differences in 
personal feelings towards the voter and beliefs about responsibility for the election’s outcome when 
comparing the party loyalist to either of the two types of believers. Thus, moral and character 
evaluations differed according to voters’ motivations, but the extremity of their motivations 
influenced the direction of subsequent evaluations: Whereas “less extreme believers” were 
regarded most favorably, “extreme believers” were evaluated most negatively.  
Importantly, these simple effects were supported by a two-way interaction between target 
(believer vs. loyalists) and belief extremity (extreme vs. less extreme) on measures of: moral 
acceptability, F(1, 381) = 135.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.26; moral character, F(1, 381) = 124.12, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = 0.25; trustworthiness, F(1, 381) = 89.19, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.19; capability of recognizing right 
versus wrong, F(1, 381) = 85.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.18; thinking before acting, F(1, 381) = 52.61, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = 0.12; and personal feelings toward the voter, F(1, 381) = 46.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.11. These 
two-way interactions supported the interpretation that party loyalists were judged more positively 
when compared to extreme believers, but less positively when compared to less extreme believers. 
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There was not a significant two-way interaction for responsibility for the election's outcome. Means 
and 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 1a. 
---------------------------------------------- 
     Insert Figure 1a Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Tolerance 
 We aimed to test whether ratings of interpersonal tolerance differed depending on a 
target’s motivations behind his or her vote, and whether these differences were affected by belief 
extremity.   
When compared to extreme believers, party loyalists were rated more favorably on 
measures of: positive trait inferences, F(1, 381) = 162.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.30; willingness to interact, 
F(1, 381) = 185.64, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.33; and feeling of closeness, F(1, 381) = 86.61, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
0.19. Interestingly, when compared to less extreme believers, party loyalists were rated significantly 
less favorably on measures of positive trait inferences, F(1, 381) = 7.21, p = .008, ηp
2 = 0.02; 
marginally significantly less favorably for feelings of closeness, F(1, 381) = 2.89, p = .090, ηp
2 = 0.01; 
but not on willingness to interact (p > .250). Central to our hypotheses, these main effects were 
supported by a significant two-way interaction between target (believer vs. loyalists) and belief 
extremity (extreme vs. less extreme) on measures of: positive trait inferences, F(1, 381) = 118.67, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = 0.24; willingness to interact, F(1, 381) = 107.65, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.22; and feelings of 
closeness, F(1, 381) = 65.57, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.14. Means and 95% confidence intervals are depicted in 
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Figure 1b. Again, party loyalists were favored over extreme believers, but were evaluated less 
positively when compared to less extreme believers.  
---------------------------------------------- 
     Insert Figure 1b Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Exposure to different voter profiles 
 In line with our hypotheses, we found evidence to suggest that people were familiar with 
voters who fit the profiles of both types of believer (extreme and less extreme) and the party 
loyalist. Agreement with each type of exposure was determined by combining people who gave a 
rating of greater than the scale midpoint of four (i.e., five, six, and seven). An overwhelming majority 
of participants agreed that they had heard about voters in the media who met all three descriptions 
(party loyalist: 75.5%; extreme believer: 67.4%; less extreme believer: 84.9%), thought these voters 
existed (party loyalist: 87%; extreme believer: 82.3%; less extreme believer: 89%), and, to a lesser 
extent, knew people who fit the description (party loyalist: 63.7%; extreme believer: 34.8%; less 
extreme believer: 70.8%).  
Discussion 
 Study 1 yielded two main conclusions. First, Study 1 found support for the motivational 
perspective across measures of moral judgment and interpersonal tolerance. Participants did not 
simply regard all outgroup voters unfavorably for supporting the participant’s non-preferred 
candidate; instead, participants took outgroup voters’ motives for casting their votes into account 
when making moral and interpersonal evaluations of them. Specifically, “less extreme believers” 
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were regarded more favorably than “party loyalists,” whereas “extreme believers” were regarded 
less favorably than “party loyalists.” In other words, participants most preferred “less extreme 
believers” who voted for a candidate out of agreement with that candidate’s more conventional 
values and positions, but least preferred “extreme believers” who were motivated by a candidate’s 
most controversial positions. This is consistent with other research showing that people are more 
likely to evaluate moderate groups more favorably than extreme groups (Hogg, 2007). In the current 
study, the “less extreme believers” are the more moderate of the two groups.  
 Second, Study 1 validated the use of the various “believer” and “party loyalist” voter profiles 
by showing that participants were aware that such voter types existed, and often knew similar 
voters themselves. Thus, although the “extreme believers” in particular were motivated by 
somewhat controversial motives, participants still felt that such voters existed in the 2016 Election.  
Study 2: Outgroup and third-party voters 
Study 2 had two primary goals. First, we included judgments of third party voters in addition 
to “believers” and “party loyalists” to measure how these non-major-party voters compared to 
those who voted for major-party candidates. Third party voters sometimes have a notable effect on 
election results and coverage: Roughly 4% of the national popular vote in the 2016 Election went to 
third party candidates (Quealy, 2016), and third party voters are sometimes the subject of 
resentment from supporters of major-party candidates, particularly if third party candidates are 
perceived to have reduced one of the major-party candidate’s chances of electoral victory (e.g., 
Nguyen, 2016). In addition, Study 2 sought to replicate Study 1’s findings in support of the 
motivational perspective, with a particular focus on how the “extreme believers” are judged in 
comparison to third party voters, both of whom we expected to be rated less favorably. Because 
2016 was an especially divisive election, we were interested in focusing specifically on voter profiles 
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that would be regarded unfavorably by outgroup observers, a more rigorous test of the motivational 
perspective. Therefore, the “less extreme believer” profile from Study 1 was not used in Study 2.  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and ninety-three American adults were recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) for compensation of $1.00. Study 2 is the combination of two separate surveys 
conducted on MTurk, both of which began with the same candidate preference question as Study 1. 
Participants could select either Clinton or Trump as their preferred candidate, and were not told that 
this question was used as a screening measure for recruitment. Participants who selected the 
candidate who was the focus of that survey continued onto the next portion of the study, whereas 
those who selected the non-focal candidate were sent to the end of the survey and compensated for 
their time. Study 2 used the same sample size determination as Study 1 (i.e., at least 60 Trump 
supporters per cell). Participants were excluded for failing the same attention (n = 3) and quality (n = 
3) checks as Study 1, resulting in a final sample of 187 participants (68.4% male; 76.5% 
White/Caucasian; Mage = 33.97 years, SDage = 10.45) that included 95 Clinton supporters and 92 
Trump supporters. Self-identified political affiliation was as follows: 34.8% Republican or lean 
Republican; 20.3% Independent; 40.1% Democrat or lean Democrat; and, the remaining 4.8% either 
had no preference, wrote in another option, or did not answer.  
Design 
All results for Study 2 are based on a combination of the two surveys used to recruit Clinton 
and Trump supporters separately, each following the same design and procedure. All participants 
judged three voters who had not voted for the participant’s preferred candidate (i.e., “outgroup” 
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voters) for differing reasons: “extreme believer” (same as Study 1); “party loyalist” (same as Study 
1); and “third party,” or someone who voted for a third party candidate out of dissatisfaction with 
the two major-party candidates. Study 2 had a mixed 2 (candidate preference: Clinton or Trump) x 3 
(target voter type: believer, loyalist, or third party) design, with candidate preference as a between-
subjects factor and voter type as a within-subjects factor. 
Procedure 
After indicating their preferred candidate (Clinton or Trump), participants read vignettes 
about three hypothetical voters (“extreme believer,” “party loyalist,” or “third party”) in a random 
order. The “extreme believer” and “party loyalist” profiles were the same those used in Study 1, and 
the “third party” profile was the same for both Clinton and Trump supporters: 
Imagine an individual who says they voted for a third party candidate because they strongly 
disliked both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton and felt that they should not only have to 
consider a major party candidate when both of those candidates were unsatisfactory. 
After reading each vignette, participants reported their moral judgments of the voter’s 
behavior and character and their tolerance for the voter, including evaluations of the voter’s 
personality traits. Lastly, participants provided demographic information. 
Measures 
 All measures for Study 2 were the same as those from Study 1, with the exception that Study 
2 excluded the exposure to different types of voters measures. As with Study 1, reliability was 
acceptable for both sets of tolerance measures (perceived traits: Cronbach’s αbeliever = .94; 
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Cronbach’s αparty loyalist = .94; Cronbach’s αthird party = .95; willingness to interact: Cronbach’s αbeliever = 
.96; Cronbach’s αparty loyalist = .96; Cronbach’s αthird party = .96).            
Results 
Data analyses 
For all analyses, we conducted mixed ANOVAs using one between-subjects factor (candidate 
preference) and one within-subjects factors (voter type). For specific values and effect sizes, please 
see the Supplemental Results.  
Moral evaluations 
 We were primarily interested in whether judgments of the three different voter types 
differed on a within-subjects basis, and there were significant evaluative differences between these 
voters in measures of: moral acceptability, F(2, 370) = 217.54, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.54; moral character, 
F(2, 370) = 232.24, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.56; trustworthiness, F(2, 370) = 172.72, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.48; 
capability of recognizing right versus wrong, F(2, 370) = 155.07, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.46; perceiving the 
voter as thinking before acting, F(2, 370) = 96.67, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.34; and personal feelings toward 
the voter, F(2, 370) = 108.83, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.37. In each case, the patterns were similar: Compared 
to “party loyalists” and “third party” voters, pairwise comparisons showed that “extreme believer” 
voters were viewed as less morally acceptable (pparty < .001; pthird < .001), of weaker moral character 
(pparty < .001; pthird < .001), less trustworthy (pparty < .001; pthird < .001), less capable of recognizing 
right versus wrong (pparty < .001; pthird < .001), thinking less before acting (pparty < .001; pthird < .001), 
and were regarded with more negative feelings (pparty < .001; pthird < .001). However, for the measure 
of perceived responsibility for the election’s outcome, there were no significant within-subjects 
effects, F(2, 370) = 2.24, p = .108. Figure 2a depicts the means and 95% confidence intervals for the 
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evaluations of the three different voter types in Study 2 (see the Supplemental Results for additional 
details). 
    ---------------------------------------------- 
     Insert Figure 2a Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
There were no between-subjects differences as a function of the participant’s preferred 
candidate in the election, except for measures of personal feelings towards the voters (F(1, 185) = 
4.52, p = .035, ηp
2 = 0.02) and perceived responsibility for the election’s outcome (F(1, 185) = 28.28, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.13); in these cases, Trump (vs. Clinton) supporters expressed more positive feelings 
toward the outgroup voters and judged the outgroup voters to be less responsible for the election’s 
outcome. Lastly, there was a significant two-way interaction of preferred candidate and voter type 
on responsibility for the election’s outcome that was not predicted: The interaction indicated that 
Clinton voters generally judged their outgroup voters as more responsible for the election’s outcome 
than Trump voters did, F(2, 370) = 3.64, p = .027, ηp
2 = 0.02. More details on these between-subjects 
main effects and interactions can be found in the Supplemental Results. 
Tolerance 
 We were primarily interested in whether tolerance towards outgroup voters differed 
depending on the motives behind their vote. These data provide strong evidence that voting motives 
influenced all measures of tolerance, including: positive trait inferences, F(2, 370) = 156.29, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = 0.46; willingness to interact, F(2, 370) = 203.89, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.52; and feelings of closeness, 
F(2, 370) = 190.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.51. Patterns were consistent across all three measures, 
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demonstrating the highest levels of tolerance towards “third party” voters, intermediate tolerance 
towards “party loyalists”, and strong intolerance towards “extreme believers”. Means and 95% 
confidence intervals for these evaluations of tolerance are plotted in Figure 2b. 
---------------------------------------------- 
     Insert Figure 2b Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Interestingly, Trump supporters were more tolerant of outgroup voters on all measures of 
tolerance, including: positive trait inferences, F(1, 185) = 6.28, p = .013, ηp
2 = 0.03; willingness to 
interact, F(1, 185) = 8.24, p = .005, ηp
2 = 0.04; and feelings of closeness,  F(1, 185) = 6.09, p = .014, ηp
2 
= 0.03. Lastly, there was a two-way interaction between candidate preference and voter type for 
willingness to interact, F(2, 370) = 10.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.05 and feelings of closeness, F(2, 370) = 
3.29, p = .038, ηp
2 = 0.02, but not for trait inferences. Clinton supporters were less willing to interact 
with and felt less close to the outgroup “extreme believer” voters than did Trump supporters. 
However, this between-subjects difference did not emerge in judgments of the “party loyalist” or 
“third party” voters. (See Supplemental Results for additional details.)  
Discussion 
 Like Study 1, Study 2 replicated findings supporting the motivational perspective, again 
finding that “extreme believers” were judged less favorably than “party loyalists.” In addition,  “third 
party” voters were regarded most favorably in both moral and interpersonal terms, suggesting that, 
when compared to true outgroup voters (i.e., those who voted for the participant’s non-preferred 
major-party candidate), participants most favored voters who opted not to vote for either major-
 
VOTING MOTIVES, MORALITY, AND TOLERANCE 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
23 
party candidate in the divisive 2016 election. This positive regard for third party voters may not be 
particularly surprising, given that they abstained from voting for the participant’s non-preferred 
major-party candidate, who is usually considered to be the main rival in presidential contests. Study 
3 examines whether these patterns replicate when judging ingroup voters, or those who voted for 
the participant’s preferred major-party candidate.  
Study 3: Judgments of ingroup voters and their motives 
 In Study 3, we examine whether the motivational perspective is supported when judging 
ingroup voters (i.e., voters who voted for one’s preferred candidate). For example, do Clinton 
supporters differentiate between other Clinton supporters depending on their motivations for 
voting? Unlike judgments of outgroup voters, it is conceivable that one might applaud all ingroup 
voters—regardless of their motives—because they voted for one’s preferred candidate, thus 
validating the consequentialist perspective and illustrating a reversal of the outgroup homogeneity 
bias. However, it is also possible that differentiation based on motives may be stronger when judging 
the ingroup because people tend to perceive more heterogeneity within the ingroup (Boldry et al., 
2007; Linville & Jones, 1980). Study 3 investigates this question. We expect that “party loyalist” 
voters should again be evaluated more favorably than “extreme believers,” and also more favorably 
than “third party” voters, who abstained from voting with a participant’s ingroup. 
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and ninety-eight American adults were recruited through MTurk for 
compensation of $1.00. Using the same screening question as Studies 1-2 to determine a 
participant’s preferred candidate, participants were presented with short vignettes about “ingroup” 
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voters who supported the same candidate as they did. Participants were excluded for failing the 
same attention (n = 11) and quality (n = 1) restrictions used in Studies 1 and 2, resulting in a final 
sample of 186 participants (48.4% male; 81.7% White/Caucasian; Mage = 33.98 years, SDage = 10.73) 
comprised of 119 Clinton supporters and 67 Trump supporters. This met our goal of at least 60 
Trump supporters per cell. Self-identified political affiliation was as follows: 25.3% Republican or 
lean Republican; 16.1% Independent; 43.2% Democrat or lean Democrat; and, the remaining 5.4% 
either had no preference, wrote in another option, or did not answer.  
Design and Procedure 
The design was almost identical to Study 2, with one exception: Participants in Study 3 
evaluated ingroup instead of outgroup voters. That is, using the same vignettes as in Study 2, 
participants read about voters with whom they agreed (in the cases of the “extreme believer” and 
“party loyalist” voters) instead of voters who had voted against the participant’s preferred 
candidate. If participants initially said they supported Trump, they rated other Trump voters. If they 
supported Clinton, they rated other Clinton supporters. Study 3 had a mixed 2 (candidate 
preference: Clinton or Trump) x 3 (target voter type: believer, loyalist, or third party) design, with 
candidate preference as a between-subjects factor and voter type as a within-subjects factor. 
Measures  
Nearly all measures were identical to those used in Study 2, with one added measure at the 
end of the study: After reading about and evaluating the three different types of voters, participants 
were asked to indicate to which of the three voter types they felt they were most similar. For answer 
options, participants could select one of the following three options: “The voter who primarily 
agreed with their preferred candidate’s positions and beliefs” (i.e., believer); “The voter who 
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supported their preferred candidate mostly because of their political party membership” (i.e., party 
loyalist); or “The voter who supported a third party candidate because they disliked both of the 
major-party candidates” (i.e., third party). When asked to indicate which of the three voter types 
they most identified with, participants who supported Clinton and Trump both displayed the same 
pattern. The largest group identified as “believers” (52.9% of Clinton supporters, 46.3% of Trump 
supporters), whereas smaller groups identified as “party loyalists” (22.7% of Clinton supporters, 
22.4% of Trump supporters) or “third party” voters (24.4% of Clinton supporters, 31.3% of Trump 
supporters). This pattern of identification did not differ significantly as a function of a participant’s 
candidate preference, X2 (2, N = 186) = 1.16, p > .250. As with Study 2, reliability was acceptable for 
both tolerance measures (perceived traits: Cronbach’s αbeliever = .94; Cronbach’s αparty loyalist = .91; 
Cronbach’s αthird party = .94; willingness to interact: Cronbach’s αbeliever = .96; Cronbach’s αparty loyalist = 
.95; Cronbach’s αthird party = .96). 
Results 
Data analyses 
For all analyses, we conducted mixed ANOVAs using one between-subjects factor (candidate 
preference) and one within-subjects factors (voter type). For specific values and effect sizes, please 
see the Supplemental Results. 
Moral evaluations 
We were primarily interested in whether judgments of the three different voter types 
differed on a within-subjects basis, and as in Studies 1 and 2, there were significant evaluative 
differences among these voters in measures of: moral acceptability, F(2, 368) = 41.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
0.18; moral character, F(2, 368) = 28.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.14; trustworthiness, F(2, 368) = 19.99, p < 
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2 = 0.10; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, F(2, 368) = 18.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.09; 
and perceiving the voter as thinking before acting, F(2, 368) = 10.37, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.05. In each 
case, the patterns were similar: Compared to “party loyalists” and “third party” voters, pairwise 
comparisons showed that “extreme believer” voters were viewed as less morally acceptable (pparty < 
.001; pthird < .001), of weaker moral character (pparty < .001; pthird < .001), less trustworthy (pparty < 
.001; pthird < .001), less capable of recognizing right versus wrong (pparty < .001; pthird < .001), and 
thinking less before acting (pparty < .001; pthird < .001). Figure 3a depicts the means and 95% 
confidence intervals for the evaluations of the three different voter types in Study 3 (see the 
Supplemental Results for additional details). 
---------------------------------------------- 
     Insert Figure 3a Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
There were also significant within-subjects differences in personal feelings toward the voter 
(F(2, 368) = 9.72, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.05), but with a slightly different pattern: In this case, participants 
reported significantly more positive feelings toward the “party loyalists” compared to the “extreme 
believers” (p < .001) or “third party” voters (p = .020). Lastly, although there was not a significant 
omnibus within-subjects result for responsibility for the election’s outcome (F(2, 368) = 2.77, p = 
.064), pairwise comparisons revealed a similar pattern to the personal feelings measure: “Party 
loyalists” were seen as more responsible for the election’s outcome than “extreme believer” (p = 
.005) and “third party” (p = .058) voters, suggesting that they had the greatest influence on the 
election’s outcome.  
 
VOTING MOTIVES, MORALITY, AND TOLERANCE 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
27 
         For all measures, there were no significant between-subjects effects of the participant’s 
preferred candidate (all ps > .250). Lastly, there were significant two-way interactions between 
candidate preference and voter type for each of the moral and character judgment measures, about 
which we had no specific predictions; decompositions of these interactions are available in the 
Supplemental Results.  
Tolerance 
 Our primary question was whether tolerance would differ as a function of motivations 
behind voting behavior for ingroup voters. As with Studies 1 and 2, these data provide strong 
evidence that motivations behind a vote influence tolerance towards ingroup voters on measures of: 
Positive trait inferences, F(2, 368) = 17.49, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.09; willingness to interact, F(2, 368) = 
32.67, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.15; and feelings of closeness, F(2, 368) = 17.78, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.09. 
Interestingly, the pattern of results differ from those of outgroup voters in that people were 
generally most tolerant of ingroup “party loyalists”. Specifically, participants made more positive 
trait inferences about, were more willing to interact with, and reported feeling closer to “party 
loyalists” than “extreme believers” (trait: p < .001; interact: p < .001; closeness: p < .001). 
Additionally, participants made more positive trait inferences about and reported feeling closer to 
“party loyalists” than “third party” voters (trait: p = .003; interact: p = .190; closeness: p = .016). 
Finally, participants were more tolerant of “third party” voters than “extreme believers” on all three 
measures (trait: p = .006; interact: p < .001; closeness: p = .002). Means and 95% confidence 
intervals for these evaluations of tolerance are plotted in Figure 3b. 
---------------------------------------------- 
     Insert Figure 3b Here 
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Interestingly, Clinton supporters were more willing to interact with ingroup and third party 
voters than were Trump supporters, F(1, 184) = 3.95, p = .048, ηp
2 = 0.02. Additionally, Clinton 
supporters made more positive trait inferences about ingroup voters than did Trump supporters, as 
evidenced by a marginally significant between-subject difference in positive trait inferences, F(1, 
184) = 2.77, p = .098, ηp
2 = 0.02. Finally, there were significant two-way interactions between voter 
type and candidate preference for trait inferences, F(2, 368) = 11.40, p < 001, ηp
2 = 0.06; willingness 
to interact, F(2, 368) = 16.49, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.08; and feelings of closeness, F(2, 368) = 8.70, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = 0.05. Decompositions of these interactions and other statistics are available in Supplemental 
Results.  
Discussion 
Like Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 found support for the motivational perspective, but with 
ingroup voters as the subjects of evaluation. For both moral and interpersonal evaluations, “extreme 
believers” were regarded the least favorably, although the effects were of slightly smaller magnitude 
than Studies 1 and 2. These results are consistent with research showing that when judging others 
who are relevant to one’s social identity—in this case, identifying with a political party or a 
candidate—people will embrace likable ingroup members and distance themselves from unlikable 
ingroup members to preserve the strength of the social identity (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). 
As a result, “extreme believers,” despite their fervor and ingroup status, are less preferred than the 
more benign “party loyalists.”  
Also like Study 2, “party loyalist” and “third party” voters were regarded more favorably. 
However, there were often no significant differences in evaluations between these two voter types, 
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despite the fact that “third party” voters, by definition, still voted against the participant’s preferred 
candidate. 
Studies 2 & 3: Do evaluations of voters differ depending on whether they are members of the 
ingroup or outgroup? 
 The data from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that evaluations of both outgroup and ingroup voters 
differ depending on those voters’ motives. Though the patterns of results are similar across studies, 
one may wonder whether the effect of motives differs depending on group membership (i.e., 
whether target voters were members of a participant’ ingroup or outgroup). To address this 
question, data from Studies 2 and 3 were combined. Next, we conducted a 2 (candidate preference: 
Trump, Clinton) x 2 (group membership: ingroup, outgroup) x 3 (voter type: extreme believer, party 
loyalist, third party) mixed ANOVA with candidate preference and group membership as between-
subjects effects and voter type as a within-subjects effect.  
Moral evaluations 
 Group membership (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup) influenced how people judged different 
types of voters, as evidenced by significant two-way interactions between group membership and 
voter type for moral acceptability, F(2, 738) = 36.46, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.09; moral character, F(2, 738) = 
42.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.10; trustworthiness, F(2, 738) = 36.83, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.09; capability of 
recognizing right versus wrong, F(2, 738) = 33.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.08; perceiving the voter as 
thinking before acting, F(2, 738) = 26.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.07; personal feelings towards the voter, 
F(2, 738) = 38.33, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.09. Responsibility for the election’s outcome did not significantly 
differ based on group membership. These patterns suggest that although people differentiated by 
motives when judging both ingroup and outgroup voters, the evaluative differences between voter 
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types were larger when judging outgroup members. Additionally, across all target types, participants 
judged ingroup voters more favorably (see Figures 2a-3b).  
Clinton and Trump supporters differed in their judgments of ingroup and outgroup voters, as 
evidenced by significant two-way interactions of candidate preference and group membership for 
moral acceptability, F(1, 369) = 4.37, p = .037, ηp
2 = 0.01; personal feelings towards the voter, F(1, 
369) = 3.86, p =.050, ηp
2 = 0.01; responsibility for the election’s outcome, F(1, 369) = 9.67, p = .002, 
ηp
2 = 0.03; and marginally significant two-way interactions for moral character, F(1, 369) = 3.48, p = 
.063, ηp
2 = 0.01; and trustworthiness, F(1, 369) = 2.49, p = .115, ηp
2 = 0.01. When judging believers 
and party loyalists, Clinton supporters show stronger differentiation between ingroup and outgroup 
voters than do Trump supporters, with Clinton supporters showing greater favor toward ingroup 
voters. 
Moreover, these two-way interactions were qualified by a significant three-way interaction 
between candidate preference, group membership, and voter type for moral acceptability, F(2, 738) 
= 11.47, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.03; moral character, F(2, 738) = 12.68, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.03; trustworthiness, 
F = (2, 738) = 6.91, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.02; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, F(2, 738) = 7.46, 
p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.02; perceiving the voter as thinking before acting, F(2, 738) = 4.58, p = .011, ηp
2 = 
0.01; personal feelings towards the voter, F(2, 738) = 6.58, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.02; and responsibility for 
the election’s outcome, F(2, 738) = 13.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.04. Specifically, Clinton supporters were 
less likely than Trump supporters to significantly differentiate between ingroup voters according to 
their motives. See Figures 2a-3b for an illustration of these effects and Table 1 for means and 
standard deviations.  
---------------------------------------------- 
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     Insert Table 1 Here 
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Tolerance 
 Group membership influenced judgments of tolerance towards different types of voters, as 
evidenced by significant two-way interactions between target and group membership for trait 
judgments, F(2, 738) = 48.04, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.12; willingness to interact, F(2, 738) = 54.13, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = 0.13; and feelings of closeness, F(2, 738) = 54.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.13. Consistent with the moral 
evaluations, differences between voter types were larger when judging outgroup (vs. ingroup) 
members. Additionally, across all target types, participants judged ingroup voters more favorably.  
Additionally, Clinton and Trump supporters differed in their ratings of ingroup and outgroup 
members, as evidenced by significant two-way interactions between candidate preference and 
group membership for trait judgments, F(1, 369) = 9.60, p = .002, ηp
2 = 0.03; willingness to interact, 
F(1, 369) = 11.69, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.03; and a marginally significant two-way interaction for feelings of 
closeness, F(1, 369) = 2.62, p = .107, ηp
2 = 0.01. Whereas Trump (vs. Clinton) supporters were more 
tolerant towards outgroup voters, Clinton (vs. Trump) supporters rated ingroup voters more 
favorable. Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between candidate preference, 
group membership, and voter type for trait judgments, F(2, 738) = 11.94, p < .001; ηp
2 = 0.03 
willingness to interact, F(2, 738) = 26.18, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.07; and feelings of closeness, F(2, 738) = 
10.967, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.03. See Figures 2a-3b for an illustration of these effects and Table 2 for 
means and standard deviations.  
---------------------------------------------- 
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     Insert Table 2 Here 
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Discussion 
 Analyses of Studies 2 and 3 together found that although participants across both studies 
differentiated between voters according to those voters’ motives, Trump supporters were more 
likely to show significant evaluative differences when judging their ingroup voters; on the other 
hand, Clinton supporters were significantly less likely to differentiate amongst ingroup voters 
according to their motives. Thus, Trump supporters may have been more attuned to voters’ motives 
regardless of in- or outgroup status, whereas Clinton supporters engaged in slightly more 
consequentialist reasoning when judging their ingroup voters.  
General Discussion 
 When judging voters and their voting decisions, people take into account their motives. In 
Study 1, neither Clinton nor Trump supporters treated outgroup voters as a monolithic group. 
Indeed, Study 1 found that participants differentiated their moral and interpersonal judgments of 
outgroup voters based on their reasons for their votes; participants consistently regarded “less 
extreme believers” more favorably than “party loyalist,” and “extreme believers” least favorably 
overall. In Study 2, judgments of outgroup voters were again influenced by motives: Moral and 
interpersonal judgments both disfavored the “extreme believer” voters, whereas “third party” 
voters were judged most positively. Studies 1-3 revealed that the extremity of motives of “believers” 
mattered: Whereas “less extreme believers” in Study 1 were judged most positively, the “extreme 
believers” in Studies 1-3 were judged most negatively. Thus, participants not only distinguished 
amongst “believer” and “party loyalist” motives, but further examined the types of values that 
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motivated “extreme” and “less extreme” believers. This pattern is consistent with research showing 
that people dislike extreme attitude-holders (Wright et al., 2008) and tend to view their own 
attitudes as less extreme (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). Lastly, Study 3 found that 
judgments of ingroup voters were similar to those of outgroup voters in Study 2—with “extreme 
believers” again regarded less favorably than “party loyalists” and “third party” voters—indicating 
that even when judging ingroup voters, participants did not simply reward those who voted for their 
preferred candidate (as the consequentialist perspective would predict). Similar to outgroup 
judgments, participants disfavored ingroup voters who held extreme views and drifted from 
moderation (Hogg, 2007; Wright et al., 2008). Lastly, across Studies 2 and 3, we found that Trump 
supporters were more likely than Clinton supporters to differentiate between ingroup voters in the 
same way they had for outgroup voters, specifically regarding their ingroup “extreme believers” 
more negatively than Clinton supporters viewed their “extreme believers.” 
 Although people are less likely to distinguish amongst outgroup members (e.g., Linville & 
Jones, 1980), our results are consistent with research indicating that people account for intentions 
and act severity when making moral and interpersonal judgments (Malle et al., 2014; Skitka et al., 
2005; Wright et al., 2008). Moreover, these results occurred for both Clinton and Trump supporters, 
indicating that being on the winning or losing side of the election did not affect the tendency to 
evaluate voters based on their motives. However, we did find that Clinton supporters were less likely 
than Trump supporters to differentiate between voter types when judging ingroup voters, instead 
showing a fairly high degree of favor to all three voter profiles; perhaps Clinton supporters, in the 
wake of an electoral loss, felt more favor for anyone who supported their preferred candidate.  
 These results suggest several future directions. “Third party” voters, who have received 
condemnation in past elections (e.g., the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election), typically fared well in our 
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participants’ eyes. Perhaps they received leniency by not voting for participants’ non-preferred 
candidate, or by remaining untainted by the historically unpopular candidates in general (Saad, 
2016); future research can assess these possibilities. Interestingly, Trump supporters were generally 
less morally and interpersonally judgmental of outgroup voters. Indeed, an October 2016 Pew 
survey (i.e., prior to the election) found that whereas 40% of Trump supporters reported difficulty 
respecting Clinton supporters, 58% of Clinton supporters reported difficulty respecting Trump 
supporters (Gramlich, 2016). Because similar patterns emerged after the election in the present 
studies, this may be more than simply a reflection of the election result and merits future research. 
To conclude, participants did not support the consequentialist perspective by universally 
condemning voters who favored their non-preferred candidate. Instead, Clinton and Trump 
supporters alike demonstrated that they were attuned to voters’ motives for casting their votes, 
varying their moral and interpersonal evaluations of different voter types. Studies 2 and 3 were 
conducted within weeks of the election, when temperatures on both sides were still quite high; 
nonetheless, people routinely considered a voter’s motives when making moral and interpersonal 
judgments, even when disagreeing with that voter’s decision. And Study 1, conducted nine months 
after the election, found a similar pattern of results, indicating that these evaluative patterns of 
different voter types were not temporary. By not universally condemning outgroup voters, 
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Appendix 
Studies 1-3 Voter Profiles 
 
Trump “extreme believer”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Donald Trump because 
they agree with his plans to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico, ban Muslim immigrants, and 
are proud of his endorsement by David Duke, former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan.  
 
Trump “less extreme believer”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Donald Trump 
because they believed in his plans to improve conditions for the middle class by bringing back 
American manufacturing jobs, repealing the Affordable Care Act (aka, Obamacare), and improving 
the nation’s infrastructure. 
 
Trump “party loyalist”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Donald Trump because they 
agree with Republican Party principles and he is the candidate their party chose, even though they 
personally disagree with his racist, sexist, misogynistic, and homophobic comments and actions. 
 
Clinton “extreme believer”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Hillary Clinton because 
they agree with her plans to disregard the Second Amendment, agree that half of Americans are 
“deplorables”, and are proud of her endorsement by Cecile Richards, the president of Planned 
Parenthood.  
 
Clinton “less extreme believer”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Hillary Clinton 
because they believed in her plans to improve conditions for the middle class by raising the 
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minimum wage, preserving the Affordable Care Act (aka, Obamacare), and improving educational 
access.  
 
Clinton “party loyalist”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Hillary Clinton because they 
agree with Democratic Party principles and she is the candidate their party chose, even though they 
personally disagree with her financial and political corruption.  
 
Third Party: Imagine an individual who says they voted for a third party candidate because they 
strongly disliked both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton and felt that they should not only have to 








VOTING MOTIVES, MORALITY, AND TOLERANCE 
 




Figure 1b. Tolerance of outgroup voters (Study 1). Positive trait inferences and willingness to interact 
were measured using a scale of 1-5, whereas feelings of closeness were measured using a scale of 1-
7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 2b. Tolerance of outgroup voters (Study 2). Positive trait inferences and willingness to interact 
were measured using a scale of 1-5, whereas feelings of closeness were measured using a scale of 1-
7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Figure 3a. Moral judgments of ingroup voters (Study 3). Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals.  
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Figure 3b. Tolerance of ingroup voters (Study 3). Positive trait inferences and willingness to interact 
were measured using a scale of 1-5, whereas feelings of closeness were measured using a scale of 1-
7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 






Extreme Believer Party Loyalist Third Party 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Moral 
acceptability 
Clinton Outgroup 2.17 1.66 3.78 1.95 5.42 1.74 
 
Ingroup 5.03 1.54 5.53 1.60 5.55 1.68 
Trump Outgroup 2.67 1.74 3.72 1.90 5.84 1.33 
 
Ingroup 3.78 1.98 5.57 1.53 6.13 1.25 
Moral character Clinton Outgroup 1.93 1.54 3.46 1.75 5.09 1.61 
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Ingroup 4.76 1.51 5.03 1.59 5.22 1.56 
Trump Outgroup 2.48 1.47 3.34 1.67 5.41 1.49 
 
Ingroup 3.64 1.82 5.31 1.37 5.58 1.55 
Trustworthiness Clinton Outgroup 2.14 1.65 3.64 1.83 4.92 1.69 
 
Ingroup 4.70 1.45 5.13 1.51 5.03 1.52 
Trump Outgroup 2.53 1.59 3.50 1.65 5.10 1.49 
 




Clinton Outgroup 2.59 1.89 4.19 2.00 5.44 1.64 
 
Ingroup 5.03 1.51 5.59 1.54 5.32 1.57 
Trump Outgroup 3.08 1.81 4.03 1.85 5.43 1.65 
 
Ingroup 4.31 1.86 5.34 1.54 5.76 1.30 
Thinking before 
acting 
Clinton Outgroup 3.00 1.75 3.79 1.74 5.09 1.74 
 
Ingroup 4.84 1.47 5.22 1.56 4.97 1.72 
Trump Outgroup 3.41 1.60 3.72 1.75 5.32 1.48 
 
Ingroup 4.22 1.66 5.18 1.52 5.42 1.47 
Personal feelings 
toward voter 
Clinton Outgroup 1.84 1.48 3.13 1.59 4.51 1.79 
 
Ingroup 4.26 1.49 4.67 1.58 4.25 1.60 
Trump Outgroup 2.57 1.64 3.36 1.48 4.49 1.54 
 




Clinton Outgroup 5.42 1.90 5.47 1.71 4.85 1.87 
 
Ingroup 4.33 1.82 4.55 1.85 4.90 1.79 
Trump Outgroup 4.21 1.88 4.05 1.81 4.20 1.76 
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Extreme Believer Party Loyalist Third Party 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Positive Trait 
Inferences 
Clinton Outgroup 1.99 0.82 2.77 0.89 3.35 0.89 
 
Ingroup 3.37 0.79 3.65 0.65 3.25 0.79 
 Trump Outgroup 2.36 0.78 2.90 0.77 3.50 0.70 
 
 
Ingroup 2.82 0.84 3.56 0.69 3.50 0.76 
Willingness to 
Interact 
Clinton Outgroup 1.62 0.95 2.78 1.20 3.79 0.98 
 
Ingroup 3.62 1.14 3.94 0.95 3.69 1.05 
 Trump Outgroup 2.40 1.12 3.01 1.20 3.80 0.97 
 
 
Ingroup 2.81 1.19 3.83 1.02 3.87 1.02 
Feelings of 
Closeness 
Clinton Outgroup 1.47 1.14 2.38 1.35 4.07 1.70 
 
Ingroup 3.69 1.81 4.17 1.59 3.61 1.53 
 
Trump Outgroup 2.10 1.38 2.92 1.61 4.13 1.59 
  
Ingroup 2.97 1.75 4.37 1.62 4.18 1.72 
 
